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Abstract
Terrorism in Africa has increased more than six-fold since 1997, with an increase
in lethality as well. The U.S. government has spent billions of dollars to counter
this increase in terrorism; however, terrorism in Africa has increased seemingly un-
abated. Furthermore, these methods used to counter-terrorism have been reactionary
as opposed to preventative. To address the terrorism threat to a country, we must
first understand which characteristics make a country vulnerable to such a threat.
A confirmatory analysis bridges the inter-discipline gap between quantitative and
qualitative fields through as assessment of observational findings about the causes
of terrorism. An exploratory analysis evaluates additional variables to find indica-
tors with predictive ability. Lastly, a classification analysis further analyzes these
indicator relationships in order identify break points where vulnerabilities are most
detected. Ultimately, these indicators should aid in providing key strategic options
to reduce the terror threat and vulnerabilities across Africa.
Key words: Terrorism, Africa, Negative Binomial Regression, Classification Tree
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INDICATORS OF
TERRORISM VULNERABILITY IN AFRICA
I. Introduction
1.1 Background Motivation
In 2006, David Kilcullen stated that there has been more written about insurgency
in the last four years then the last four decades, when the terminology was created [2].
Terrorist organizations, in recent history, have been conducting operations similar to
insurgents, such as living among the population in highly urbanized areas, where they
conduct both recruiting and operations. It is important to note that this increased
interest in terrorism is not based upon a single event, but in an increasing trend in
terrorist attacks. From the years 1968-1997, the global average number of attacks
ranged between 243 and 305 events annually. However, since 1997, that number has
increased more than 6 times resulting in between 1589 to 1895 events per year [3].
Between these time periods, the lethality of terrorist attacks have also increased [3].
The United States government states that it has “no greater responsibility then en-
suring the safety and security of the American people.” [4] Today, the global terrorism
threat presents the greatest viable threat to the American people and therefore, is
one of the main focuses of the United States government, as well as the rest of the
world.
Despite the importance of the issue, little is known about modern terrorism. Par-
tially, this is due to the nature of today’s insurgents, who differ significantly in terms
of “policy, strategy, operational art, and tactical technique” from past insurgents [2].
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Consequently, this puts the United States and the world as a whole in a position
where we know little about this global threat. Furthermore, this lack of understand-
ing of this adversary has caused the U.S. to take a reactionary stance to countering
terrorism, instead of a preventative stance.
1.2 African Focus
Many individuals have analyzed relationships between variables at the country
level and the number of terrorist attacks in that country. This analysis ranges in
size from a global scale to southeastern Turkey. Despite this wide range, looking
specifically at terrorism at the country level in Africa has not been conducted in the
current literature.
Many terrorist groups have been both forming and/or expanding operations in
Africa [5]. Additionally, Africa serves as both a recruiting ground and sanctuary
for terrorists [6]. Africa creates a security dilemma for the United States. The ad-
vent of terrorism has caused the United States to be as vulnerable to weak states as
strong states and the U.S. has a lot of poorly secured targets in Africa [6]. Conse-
quently, American involvement has increased in Africa and the military established
the AFRICOM command in February 2007 [6].
This provides a vast security dilemma for both Africa and the rest of the world.
By focusing this research on Africa, specific insights into this problem can be gained,
which can lead to a specific strategy to potentially prevent terrorist attacks in the
future.
Africa has numerous traits that when aggregated drastically separate it from the
rest of the world. Some of these traits include a low openness to trade, low primary
school enrollment, a low investment portion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a high
public spending portion of GDP, high population growth, and strategic resources such
2
as oil and natural gas [5]. Consequently, this research focuses on Africa to unveil the
specific relationships between socio-economic traits and the prevalence of vulnerability
to terrorist attacks.
1.3 Problem Statement
To better understand the current terrorism threat in Africa, this research addresses
the following three questions.
1. Can the qualitative relationships considered indicators of terrorism be quantita-
tively supported with a generalized linear model?
2. Can other potential indicators of terrorism be quantitatively explored and sup-
ported with a generalized linear model?
3. Can these variable relationships undergo classification methods, such as classifica-
tion trees, in order to determine breakpoints in characteristics of countries, which
indicate increased vulnerability to terror attacks?
Answering these questions helps confirm and/or explore which characteristics best
describe patterns among terrorism targets in Africa. Then, determining breakpoints
of these characteristics provides an opportunity to reduce Africa’s vulnerability to
terrorism. Terrorism reductions will occur by adopting a strategy that shapes the
environment and limits specific areas of vulnerability from future terrorist attacks.
The hope is these insights will be adopted by the U.S. to strategically disrupt the
terrorism threat in Africa.
1.4 Proposed Approach
Multivariate techniques are applied to data characterizing each country, such as
socio-economic and demographic attributes. The response variable is the annual
3
number of terrorist attacks in an African country, while the independent variables
are various socio-economic and other country characteristics. This analysis provides
insight into African terrorism and helps suggest methods the U.S. can alter its strategy
based upon this new information.
1.5 Preview
Chapter 2 discusses the compiled literature review associated with this problem.
This includes important definitions, the current U.S. policy for counter-terrorism and
similar research. This past research analyzes both common methodology techniques,
as well as current beliefs about socio-economic statistics and terrorism. Chapter 3
focuses upon the methodology and analysis of the first research question listed in
Section 1.3. This includes a description of the data, the proposed approach and ac-
companying assumptions, the analysis results, as well as the validation techniques.
Chapter 4 focuses upon the methodology and analysis of the second research question
listed in Section 1.3. This includes an overview of the data and results of the analysis.
Chapter 5 further explores classification analysis for the indicators specified in Chap-
ter 4 in order to find break-points in the data, which answers the third question listed
in Section 1.3. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the research, highlighting the research
insights and detailing areas for future study.
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II. Literature Review
This chapter begins by defining terms used throughout the research, then the cur-
rent U.S. counter-terrorism policy is overviewed including homeland risk, and lastly,
similiar research and their results are reviewed.
2.1 Definitions
Two important definitions to define upfront are terrorism and vulnerability.
Terrorism.
One commonly debated definition is that of terrorism. The Department of State
defines terrorism as “means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents [7].” While
the Department of Defense (DoD) defines terrorism as “The unlawful use of violence
or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism
is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed
in the pursuit of goals that are usually political [8].” Despite some similarities, even
departments within the U.S. government do not use a consistent definition. For
instance, the Department of State specifies that terrorist attacks are committed by
subnational groups or agents against noncombatants, while the DoD does not include
these specifications. While the differences may seem trivial at first, this means that
the DoD could consider an attack from a nation against the U.S. military as a terrorist
attack. Additionally, the Department of State clarifies that the terrorist attack must
actually occur, while the DoD considers threats of terrorism as terrorist attacks.
Therefore, the specific definition of terrorism used helps clearly define the scope of
the analysis and to have clear boundaries defining what does and does not constitute
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an attack.
Enders and Sandler define terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat to use
violence by individuals or subnational groups in order to obtain a political or social
objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate
victims [9].” They go on to state that the majority of modern terrorism definitions
have two main components, presence or threat of violence and political or social objec-
tive. Definitions also commonly explain that terrorism is committed by a perpetrator,
against a victim, and for an audience. The Department of State and Department of
Defense both contain these common components.
These common components of definitions of modern terrorism highlight much
about modern terrorist. For instance, the goal of modern terrorism is to circumvent
the standard politics of a country and cause political change through threats and
violence [9]. Secondly, although attacks are premeditated and planned against certain
targets, there is a secondary target, which is the audience. In order to instill fear in
this audience, and therefore have some level of control over them, terrorists attempt
to make their actions appear random. By doing this, the audience is unsure when
or where the next attack will occur. Therefore, more fear is instilled in the audience
because of the uncertainty around becoming victims of the next attack [9]. This leaves
the population, or its representative government, with two distinct choices, concede
to the terrorists or stop the terrorists. The U.S. has clearly stated its intention to stop
terrorists [4], and must create an effective strategy to complete this task. Over the
last decade, a strategy has been developed, but it has proven to be rather ineffective
[10]. A new strategy must be adopted that will allow the U.S. to meet its goals.
The definition of terrorism used for this research is that used by the National Con-
sortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). START
uses the following definition to determine inclusion into the Global Terrorism Database
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(GTD). The GTD defines a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal
force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or
social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” For the database, to include an
incident, all three of the following attributes must be present [11]:
1. The incident must be intentional, the result of a conscious calculation on the part
of a perpetrator.
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence including
property violence, as well as violence against people.
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be subnational actors. The database does
not include acts of state terrorism.
Furthermore, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident
to be included into the GTD [11]:
Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or
social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit
does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more
profound, systemic economic change.
Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or con-
vey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the
immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is consid-
ered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act
was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision
makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize,
the intentionality criterion is met.
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Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activi-
ties. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by
international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against
deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).
Vulnerability.
Haimes defines vulnerability as, “manifestation of the inherent states of the sys-
tem that can be exploited to adversely affect that system.” [12] This definition focuses
on vulnerability from a systems perspective, which is useful for determining the dif-
ferent components of terrorism production. However, the DoD outlines the following
definitions of vulnerability in DoD Instruction 2000.16: [13].
• In anti-terrorism, a situation or circumstance, which if left unchanged, may
result in the loss of life or damage to mission essential resources.
• The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means
through which its war fighting potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced
or will to fight diminished.
• The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation
(incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been
subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (man-made) hostile envi-
ronment.
• The characteristics of an installation, system, asset, application, or its depen-
dencies that could cause it to suffer a degradation or loss (incapacity to perform
its designated function) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level
of threat or hazard.
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It is rather apparent, that the DoD definitions encompass Haimes definition for
vulnerability and is specific to anti-terrorism. Consequently, the DoD definition of
vulnerability is utilized throughout the remainder of the research.
2.2 Current Policy
It is vital to understand what is currently perceived about terrorism and the
current U.S. policy regarding modern terrorism and its accompanying threats. This
process begins with what the United States government is currently doing and the
anti-terrorism National Security Strategies. The United States government’s goal
in regards to terrorism, especially al-Qa’ida is to “disrupt, degrade, dismantle and
defeat” [4].
The plan of attack to achieve this goal is split into long term and short term
strategies. The long term strategy is “advancing freedom and human dignity through
effective democracy” [14]. The strategy uses democracy as a vessel for freedom and
human dignity and is directly related to four aspects of the United States’ beliefs
about terrorism. First, the U.S. believes terrorists derive from political alienation
within their own country. Democracy should aid this issue since every person has an
equal role in the government. Second, terrorist beliefs grow out of past grievances with
the government or other parties. Democracy settles disputes peacefully and orderly
within the legal system. Third, terrorists come from conspiracy and misinformation
subcultures and it is believed that freedom of speech allows them to hear the truth
as well as the misinformation giving the individual more choices. Fourth, terrorists
have an ideology that justifies murder. However, a respect for human dignity limits
a mind set like this from ever taking place [14].
The U.S. government also specifically states some attributes which are believed not
to promote terrorism. First, terrorism is not a result from a poverty mentality, which
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is supposedly based upon the information the U.S. currently has about terrorists.
Second, terrorism does not come from hostility to past U.S. policy, since the U.S.
is not the only target. Third, terrorists are not motivated by U.S.-Israeli relations,
because attacks were planned during the peace of the 1990’s. Lastly, terrorism is not
a response to U.S. offenses since we did not attack first [14].
The U.S. government’s short term strategy is broken into four sub-strategies [14]:
Strategy 1. Preventing attacks from terrorists by preemptively attacking their re-
sources, including leadership.
Strategy 2. Protecting the homeland by preventing entry of terrorists to the country
and defending likely targets in the country.
Strategy 3. Denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction.
Strategy 4. Deny terrorists control of any country and eliminate terrorist safe havens.
There are two defined tactics to obtain these four sub-strategies. First, depriving non-
state actors of funding, recruitment, information, and support (FRIS) [15]. Second,
the United States focuses on defending itself. Clearly, the short term sub-strategies
are basic defensive and offensive strategies of war and do not incorporate any specific
tactics related to terrorism.
To accomplish these terrorism goals, the United States will need to reconsider
strategy and incorporate all elements of its power, not only military elements. These
measures are commonly divided into four groups, diplomatic, information, military,
and economic (DIME model). The affect of the instruments of power are measured
by the impact to political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
effects (PMESII) [15]. A major issue with these tools and effects are that they are
complex, have unpredictable effects and interactions, and have no way to measure
return on investment [15].
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2.3 Homeland Risk
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one organization that the U.S
uses outside of military force to engage in counter-terrorism. DHS was created with
the mission of “preventing terrorist attacks, reducing vulnerability to such attacks,
and providing emergency response in the event of an attack.” [16] The DHS strives
to use risk assessment in order to better defend the nation through prevention and
reduced vulnerability. Risk is commonly defined by the risk triplet: scenario, the
probability of that scenario, and the consequences of that scenario [17].
Conducting a risk assessment of terrorism of this manner is an extremely difficult
task. First, simply defining a scenario is extremely difficult, because terrorists will
conduct any scenario that will meet their goals. To defend in this manner, one needs
an exhaustive list of scenarios [18]. With the enemy being able to make decisions and
able to react to any defensive move that the United States implements, creating an
exhaustive list of scenarios would be essentially impossible. For an exercise in scope,
the DHS was asked to compile a list of “critical assets” to defend the dispersion of
its budget to certain areas. The list had 77,069 entries [16]. Next, every potential
scenario would have to be applied to these “critical assets.” This task would be endless
if the scope were expanded to all possible targets.
The second portion of risk is calculating the probability of the scenario. Clearly,
this is problematic, since few successful attacks have been conducted in the U.S.
making scenario-specific probabilities difficult to calculate. Additionally, determining
the probability of a scenario is extremely difficult due to the terrorist’s ability to react,
the defenses that the United States puts in place, and factors outside of both parties’
control. Another suggestion is to replace the second portion of the risk triplet with
a degree of difficulty to successfully accomplish the scenario against the target under
consideration [19]. This degree of difficulty must take into account both terrorist
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beliefs and homeland defense for a defined scenario [19]. As mentioned above, this
is extremely difficult, but is much easier to calculate from the available data than a
probability of scenario [19].
The last portion of the risk triplet is determining the consequences, which also
requires a specified scenario and complex computations to compile accurate effects.
Additionally, computing accurate effects is exceptional difficult due to second, and
tertiary effects aside from the main effects. While fruitful attempts have been made
to quantify the risks of terrorism, the task is very difficult to put a quantitative for-
mula to human driven activities [20]. Risk analysis through these means is primarily
focused upon the consequences and the mitigation of these consequences instead of
the prevention of the attack.
Not only is the current counter-terrorism strategy at its core reactionary, it also
lacks effectiveness. A survey paper [10] dedicated to evaluating current counter ter-
rorism strategies came to the following conclusions. Despite billions of dollars spent
annually on counter-terrorism strategies, very little research has been conducted to
determine the effectiveness of these strategies. However, using the current available
research, no counter-terrorism strategy consistently reduces the number of terrorist
attacks. Using metal detectors caused a decreased number of skyjackings, but caused
an increased number of non-skyjacking terrorist attacks. Clearly, metal detectors did
not reduce the number of attacks, but instead displaced certain types of attacks. In
risk analysis, this displacement is known as risk transference and implies that no risk
is actually reduced. Additionally, fortifying embassies, protecting diplomats, higher
punishments for skyjacking, and United Nation resolutions all showed no effect on
the number of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, retaliation for terrorist attacks with
military force, raised the number of attacks, especially in the short term. Lastly,
having political parties that are intolerant of terrorist attacks increased the number
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of all types of terrorist attacks except for non-casualty attacks. The U.S. drastically
needs to change counter-terrorism tactics in order to be more effective, and this needs
to come from a better understanding of terrorism.
The DHS has made preliminary moves to better understand terrorist and have
decided to analyze simple risk indicators beyond the already described event-based
models for risk assessment [16]. These risk indicators do not use the current knowledge
of terrorist preferences and priorities to help prioritize targets to defend, but are an
attempt to look at the general types of targets that terrorists attack. The first metric
is the product of population and population density [16]. This shows that terrorists
prefer to target large population centers, which is concurrent with other research
stating that terrorist attacks are positively correlated with population [21, 22]. This
makes sense since terrorists aim to influence a population based upon fear and more
people will be fearful since more people will experience an attack and the media is
more likely to report a large attack. It is additionally interesting to note that modern
terrorists conceal themselves in cities and industrialized centers rather than rural
areas. Historically, insurgents would hide in rural areas away from people that are
able to detect them. However, changes in technology has made hiding in cities more
effective, especially when blending in with a sympathetic population. Additionally,
it puts insurgents right next to the individuals they are trying to “win” [2].
Another indicator that the DHS uses is the product of population, population
density, and sum of critical infrastructure elements [16]. It is not surprising that
terrorists are going to additionally focus on critical infrastructure elements, since this
increases the amount of people impacted by the attack, as well as the affect of the
attack itself. These indicators take the terrorist strategy into account and allows
the United States to better protect itself and are the beginning of a good defensive
strategy. However, since there are many population centers and critical infrastructure
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elements, more indicators should be identified in order to develop better defenses and
even more indicators are necessary to create a preventative strategy or predictive
model.
2.4 Similar Research
In the academic community, many scholars have attempted to determine relation-
ships between certain socio-economic country characteristics and terrorism, specifi-
cally where terrorists originate or target. Despite the amount of research, many socio-
economic characteristics remain unexplored or highly debated. In order to learn from
this previous research and understand current knowledge in the academic community,
similar academic research has been analyzed and summarized to include common
methodologies and current relationship beliefs about certain socio-economic country
characteristics and terrorist attacks.
Prominent Variable Relationships.
Carter’s Five Factors.
Terrorism has become a topic of study for many institutions, including those out-
side of the military and government. Interest has come from individuals in psychology,
sociology, economics, medical and engineering studies.
One approach to determine the kind of factors that contribute to a terrorist mind-
set or make countries vulnerable to a terrorist mindset is to analyze countries that
currently provide safe haven for terrorist networks or at least allow them to oper-
ate unabated. Carter [23] analyzed countries which harbor, willingly or unwillingly,
terrorist networks in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Carter qualitatively as-
sessed these countries to have five factors in common. These factors included poverty,
lack of border control, political corruption, fragile economies, and social fragmenta-
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tion [23]. It is important to note that these factors were not quantitatively assessed,
but rather based upon observation. However, each variable intuitively makes sense to
have a relationship with the number of terrorist attacks in a country and worthwhile
for further analysis.
The first factor is poverty. The aim of terrorism is to use fear to coerce the popu-
lation into joining and supporting their cause. Poverty allows terrorism to operate on
many levels. First, impoverished countries usually have impoverished governments
that are unable to provide the necessary services to deter terrorism. Second, impover-
ished countries have impoverished people that are more vulnerable to being recruited
by terrorist. Insurgents are no longer seeking money, but actually have financial
power to “win” the population [2].
The U.S. government agrees with the belief that terrorism is related to poverty
[4, 14]. However, the quantitative literature on the relationship between economics
and terrorists attacks, tell a much different story. GDP per capita and number of
terrorist attacks have shown to have a negative relationship in some quantitative
research based upon the belief that it is cheaper to attack impoverished people [21],
while other research shows a significant positive relationship based upon the belief
that terrorist want to target wealthier people, since more people will become aware
of the attack [24]. Additionally, other research has analyzed the non-linear terms as
well and shown that the relationship between GDP per capita and number of terrorist
attacks is actually a concave parabolic function as shown in Figure 1 [25, 22, 26]. One
reason for the difference in findings could be related to the difference in methodologies.
Li [21], which found a negative relationship, using a pooled time series approach,
while Street [24] came to the opposite conclusion with a Poisson panel estimation
based upon analyzing an attacks by where the home nation of the attackers, instead
of the actual location of the attack. However, this parabolic finding could further
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explain the differing results. The parabolic finding is further supported by three
different researchers with two different methodologies, zero-infalted negative binomial
regression [25, 26] and Poisson regression [22, 26], coming to the same conclusion.
Figure 1. Notionalized relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and GDP
per capita
Another method to evaluate poverty is based upon income inequality. This ap-
proach is based upon the belief that poverty is relative, individuals only feel impover-
ished in comparison to wealthy neighbors. Consequently, income inequality is another
interesting factor for analysis and has shown a positive relationship to the number of
terrorist attacks using a pooled time series approach [21].
The second factor is lack of border control. A country lacking border control
is related to a country lacking security means. A lack of border control provides
terrorists the means to easily and safely transport supplies, finances, and people,
making attacks easier and survival possible. A simple increase in border control could
be useful in inhibiting terrorists and increasing the cost of conducting attacks. While
there is little literature showing statistical quantitative support for border security,
Piazza [27] indicates strength of government as an important factor. From a failed
state perspective, the strength of the government is negatively correlated with number
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of terrorist attacks based upon a negative binomial regression model.
The third factor is political corruption. Once again, [27] Piazza shows a negative
relationship exists between corrupt governments and security necessary to prevent
terrorism. Additionally, a corrupt government does not have the support of its people
and the people do not feel like the government will protect them when necessary.
This relationship has some statistical support when analyzing from the failed state
perspective using negative binomial regression.
The fourth factor is fragile economies, which is related to poverty. However, the
fragility of the economy also makes the country more vulnerable to terrorist attacks,
since an attack will be so devastating that the country will have difficulty “bouncing
back” causing the effect of the attack to be much greater. Additionally, joining a
terrorist network could be the only form of a steady income for a family.
A direct measure of economic fragility is difficult to obtain. Proxies for the fragility
of economies could include the interaction with other economies or the globalization
of a nation. Conducting a pooled time series analysis, the interaction with other
economies and globalization were both shown to have a positive relationship with the
number of terrorist attacks [21]. However, analyzing non-linear terms showed a convex
parabolic relationship between international trade and the number of attacks as seen
in Figure 2 [25], it is important to note that this article focused on the nationalities of
people attacked instead of the country where the attack occurred, so further analysis
should be conducted. Utilizing a Poisson regression, openness to trade was found to
have a positive relationship with the number of terrorist attacks [22].
Another potential proxy for economic fragility is economic growth. Research has
shown that growth in real GDP is negatively correlated with terrorist attacks [22].
Coupling these results with the finding that in Africa, transnational terrorism has a
negative relationship with economic growth [5], shows that terrorism and economic
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Figure 2. Notionalized relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and amount
of international trade
growth create a negative feedback loop resulting in greater amount of terrorism and
lower levels of economic growth.
The final factor is social fragmentation. Social fragmentation is the splintering
of a country’s populace into distinct portions. Usually these portions are upset with
the government, when they under represented and consequently put down by the
government. When a terrorist group operates against the government, the people
who share their views (i.e. religious, cultural) are much more likely to support the
terrorists. This fragmentation is a common source of civil conflict and the presence of
civil conflict increases the quantity of terrorist attacks as well based upon a Poisson
panel estimation [24].
A case study of the Taliban supports the proposed realtionship between terrorism
and fragmentation [28]. In early 2006, the Taliban used the following five slogans
to gain members: 1. “Our party, the Taliban” 2. “Our people and nation, the
Pashtun” 3. “Our economy, the poppy” 4. “Our constitution, the Shari’a” 5. “Our
form of government, the emirate”. These slogans are used as “rallying calls” to gain
supporters. Clearly, the Taliban uses its propaganda to bring in people that want
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their own political party, their own ethnicity as a nation, that have been prevented
from making a living by growing poppies, from people agreeing with their religion,
and wanting a new government.
While this case study shows how terrorists have capitalized on fragmentation.
Poisson panel estimation analysis in regards to religion show that a larger percentage
of Christians or a larger percentage of Muslims in the population correspond to an
increased number of terrorist attacks [24]. However, Street also recorded that a larger
Jewish population resulted in less attacks, which likely occurred since the analysis only
looked at attacks for non-state actors. This analysis only focused on fragmentation
in terms of religion, but it is clear that further analysis on social fragmentation and
its potential relationship to terrorism is needed.
Review of Additional Variables.
The factors highlighted in Carter’s analysis need further quantitative investigation,
but the literature also contains other variables and relationships of note that will be
reviewed in this section.
The literature debates whether some variables have a relationship with terrorist
attacks. One of these highly contentious variables is the level of democracy in a coun-
try. The U.S. government has stated numerous times that an increase in democracy,
leads to a decrease in terrorism [4, 14]. However, a negative binomial regression re-
turned results that the level of democracy has no effect on the number of terrorist
attacks [27]. Li, using pooled time series, and Street, using Poisson panel analyses,
reported an increasing relationship with the number of terrorist attacks [21, 24].
Another potential reason for the opposing results could be that terrorism databases
usually access public media to record terrorist attacks, so a democratic country would
report these attacks more often than other types of governments. In order to deter-
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mine the underlying causes of democracy, Li breaks up democracy into numerous
representative factors [29]. Using a negative binomial regression, Li’s results showed
a positive relationship between freedom of the press, amount of government con-
straints, number of regime changes and the number of terrorist attacks. It is impor-
tant to note that freedom of the press was added to the model in order to account
for underreporting bias.
The vast majority of datasets recording terrorist attacks are based upon media
sources. Since countries with freedom of the press report more attacks than their
counterparts, adding freedom of the press to models to account for this underreport-
ing bias is a common tactic [30]. There was a negative relationship between voter
turnout, citizen satisfaction, electoral participation, and the number of terrorist at-
tacks. By breaking democracy into constituent components, Li provided insight to
what is truly going on with the relationship between democracy and terrorist attacks.
This approach could be used on some of the other debated variables in the literature
to display the underlying reasoning behind the results.
Since the DHS uses population density as an indicator for potential terrorists
attacks, the organization apparently expects more attacks to occur in cities than
anywhere else. It would be wise to further analyze cities if anything other than size
of the city is a factor related to terrorist attacks. Research shows that a city with
an aging infrastructure, such as roads and housing are more likely to have terrorist
attacks than their modern counterparts. Additionally, cities are more vulnerable
based upon the topographical location and layout of the city [31]. These indicators
show the kinds of targets that terrorists seek out whether consciously or unconsciously.
Lastly, location ended up being one of the major factors of determination between a
city that is vulnerable to an attack and a city that is relatively safe from an attack
[31]. This shows that very specific factors play a large role in terrorist attacks at the
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local level and it would be in the best interest of the DHS to identify more of these
factors. These indicators are very insightful, but are unhelpful in terms of analysis at
the country level.
The amount of education is another commonly analyzed factor. Street shows a
positive correlation between the number of terrorist attacks and the average years of
education achieved in a country, but goes on to comment that this is likely due to
the beliefs and principles of the school systems in the country [24]. Using a Poisson
regression instead of a panel regression, Street showed that education level has a
negative relationship with terrorism, except in Europe and Islamic countries were the
relationship is insignificant and positive, respectively [22]. This last analysis shows
the importance of analyzing the world by region.
Regional differences are important to consider when analyzing terrorism due to
various factors that differ from region to region (i.e. tactics, government, climate,
etc.). Analyzing only southeastern Turkey highlighted that an economy based upon
agriculture and government services have a relationship with the number of terrorist
attacks in the region [32]. Examining different geographic regions can also return
opposing results. For instance, level of investment and number of patents are nega-
tively correlated with terrorism in the entire world, but have a positive reelationship
in Islamic countries. Clearly, location is a very important factor which should be
analyzed to better understand terrorist attacks.
There is also a debate whether U.S. foreign policy has any relationship with ter-
rorism. The U.S. government states that no relationship exists [14], however another
study utilizing principle components analysis and factor analysis showed that an un-
popular U.S. foreign policy causes the U.S. to be a common driver of transnational
terrorism [33]. It is interesting to note that a positive relationship was found between
contributions to the U.N. budget of the victim country and the number of terrorist
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attacks using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression [25]. There is likely a re-
lationship between U.S. or coalition membership foreign policy and terrorist attacks.
As done previously with democracy, it may be beneficial to break up U.S. foreign
policy into its constituent properties to determine any hidden relationships.
After exploring these different variable relationships, our research will set out
on exploratory analysis to find additional variables and define their relationship to
terrorism.
Survey Paper Review.
An extensive research effort has been conducted to explore these relationships.
However, the size of this research has grossly out scaled consolidation efforts to com-
pile all of this research into a simple form. The most recent consolidation efforts
include a survey paper titled “What causes terrorism?”, by Krieger and Meierrieks
[34], and another working paper titled “Lock, stock and barrel: A comprehensive
assessment of the determinants of terror” [1]. While these papers are very detailed
and thorough in their consolidation efforts, there is room for improvement. First,
the newest paper analyzed is from the year 2011 and this is only one paper. This
means that a lot of recent research on terrorism has not been considered and addi-
tional consolidation should occur to update the consolidation. Second, neither paper
focuses upon the quantitative methods used to capture these relationships. There-
fore, this paper will first summarize the findings in these two survey papers. Then,
an assessment of recent literature will be conducted to update these consolidation
efforts. Lastly, a literature assessment of methodologies used to find the relationships
between variables and terrorist attacks will be assessed and compiled.
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“What causes terrorism?”.
Krieger and Meierrieks are two respected names in terrorism research and have
multiple publications in the area. This survey paper was published in 2011, but only
contains sources from 2010 and before. However, this paper references 96 other papers
and consolidates their findings into four areas. These four areas include sources of
transnational terrorism, targets of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, and
research that does not specify the type of terrorism [34]. In may variable relationships,
research comes to different conclusions. This paper specifies economic deprivation,
modernization strain, political and institutional order, political transformation and
instability, identity and culture clash, global economic and public order, and conta-
gion. The authors explain the different findings in the research with the following five
reasons:
1. Different dependent variables
2. Different data sources (ITERATE, MIPT, RAND)
3. Different time periods
4. Different exploratory variables
5. Different methodologies
Despite all of these reasons for debate among variable relationships, the survey
paper found a few synonymous findings. Most of these findings occur because only
one paper analyzed the specific variable. In regards to being sources of terrorism,
some of these relationship include a positive relationship in regards to unequal al-
liances in power and a negative relationship in regards to World Trade Organization
membership. Two researchers agreed that receiving foreign aid decreases being a
source of terrorism.
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In regards to being a target of terrorism, one article confirms a positive rela-
tionship with being in recession, youth burden, population density, illiteracy, new
democracies, unfair balance of trade, and linguistic diversity. Two or more findings
included a negative relationship for income inequality and regime stability and a
positive relationship with state failure.
In unspecified terrorism, more than three articles agreed that contagion, or lagged
autoregressive term, promotes terrorist attacks both temporally and spatially. Addi-
tionally, it is important to note that fourteen articles agreed that population has a
positive effect on terrorism, but one paper came to the opposite conclusion.
“Lock, stock and barrel: A comprehensive assessment of the deter-
minants of terror”.
Gassebner and Luechinger’s paper entitled “Lock, Stock, and Barrel: A com-
prehensive assessment of the determinants of terror” is a much more comprehensive
survey of modern literature [1]. However, this is a working paper from 2011 and only
references one paper from that year. The other 107 referenced articles were written
before 2011. This paper breaks up terrorism into three categories of analysis: analysis
based upon where the attacks occurred, analysis based upon the targets, or victims,
of the attack, and analysis on the perpetrators of the attack. This review of the
literature produced 65 correlates that were re-assessed for robustness. These vari-
ables were re-assessed using Extreme Bound Analysis, which compares ”commonly
accepted” variables to variables of interest. The ”commonly accepted” variables in-
clude GDP per capita, population size and level of democracy, since these are the most
commonly analyzed variables in the literature. The authors recorded the percentage
of regressions where the variables of interest were significantly different zero to assess
robustness. Robustness is defined as scoring above a 90% and this robustness score
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is checked for the three common data sources (MIPT, ITERATE, and GTD) and
variants of these datasets related to aspects of terrorism.
Due to the comprehensive assessment, this paper has many results of interest.
First, the degree of democracy and GDP per capita are not robustly associated with
terrorism. This result is very interesting since so much research disputes these specific
variables. Second, the authors found 18 variables that are robust based upon location
of the attack, 15 associated with the targets of the attack, and 6 related to the
perpetrators of the attack. Of the 18 variables based upon location only physical
integrity rights and religious tension are robust for all three data sources with a
negative and positive relationship, respectively. Population size, economic freedom
and infant mortality rate came to the same conclusion for two of the data sets. These
results as well as the other 13 robust variables can be found in Table 1.
For the analysis focused on the victims and perpetrators of terrorism, economic
freedom (negative relationship), physical integrity rights (negative relationship), and
having an internal war supported by external countries (positive relationship) all come
to the same conclusion for all three data sets. The results of this analysis can be seen
in Table 2.
While these papers do provide a broad overview of terrorism literature, they do
not capture more recent research, since they were both written in 2011. Consequently,
a broad overview on some articles that were not included in these survey papers will
be conducted.
Methodologies to find relationships between characteristics and terror-
ist attacks.
Within the terrorism analysis literature, many different methodologies are used
from systems thinking to game theory and from comparisons of means to multivariate
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Table 1. Lock, Stock, and Barrel: results of location focused EBA analysis [1]
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Table 2. Lock, Stock, and Barrel: results of victim and perpetrator focused EBA
analysis [1]
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techniques. Since different methodologies can lead to different conclusions, the topic
of methodologies is very important. The research questions laid out in Section 1.3 can
be answered using a variety of strategies. By analyzing the methodologies of others,
it is possible to determine what works well, what may not work, and other strategies
to overcome common problems.
One of these techniques is to analyze the interaction between the United States
and terrorists through game theory, which helps to capture the action and reaction
of the players [18]. While conducting this analysis certainly is a step in the right
direction, this does not fix the previously mentioned problems of being unable to
determine every scenario and the likelihood of that scenario. Furthermore, classical
game theory is difficult to apply to this problem because the desired outcomes of
terrorists and the U.S. government greatly differ from each other. Additionally, the
utilities and objectives are very different for different types of terrorist groups. For
instance, a nuclear attack on American soil has a greater benefit for al-Qa’ida than
a disgruntled American [18]. The changes in tactics by an intelligent adversary, the
changing political and economic environments as well as new and changing sources
of intelligence make it difficult to apply game theory to terrorist attacks. However,
game theory analysis does attempt to take the current knowledge about terrorism
and apply it to U.S. strategy, so it is a step in the right direction.
Another method is to use a systems thinking based approach. Schoenenberger
et. al. [35] used this approach to analyze terrorism as a system and compartmental-
ized it into recruitment, impact of attack, media, resources, and a negative view of
industrialized nations [35]. This approach has advantages, especially in determining
portions of the system to infiltrate. However, it lacks the quantitative rigor neces-
sary to determine which relationships will provide insight into the terrorist choices in
targets.
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Since this research is based upon the relationships between certain country charac-
teristics and the total number of terrorist attacks, multivariate techniques can aid in
discovering underlying patterns in historical terrorist attacks. However, even within
multivariate techniques, many potential options exist and are applicable to this prob-
lem. Some of the methodologies currently analyzed in the literature include negative
binomial or Poisson regression techniques, both with and without the zero-inflated
specification, benchmark analysis using logit or probit models, classification trees,
and principle components analysis.
Due to the nature of the data, many individuals have not used a simple linear
regression technique. However, many other regression techniques have been used. One
potential methodology is to use a negative binomial regression [27, 29]. Additionally,
some researchers’ data on terrorist attacks contained a large number of zeros, causing
them to conduct a zero-inflated negative binomial regression [25, 36]. While the
negative binomial regression is the most common technique, others various regression
techniques have been used including a pooled time series regression [21], a cross-
sectional time series regression [30], a mixed effects Poisson regression model [22, 37],
or a Poisson panel estimation [24].
A benchmark analysis is another potential regression technique. In order to assess
urban vulnerability to terrorist attacks, a model was created that was able to deter-
mine cities with a vulnerability above 50%, which would be a very useful tool for the
DHS [31]. For this specific model, having a vulnerability above 50% means that at
least one terrorist attack is likely to occur in the city. Other researchers have used
this same benchmark, but have used logit and probit models to determine whether
an attack is likely to occur in a specified region [32, 37].
Classification trees, similar to the benchmark analysis, seek cutoff points among
variables. Depending on the analysis, being on one end of this cutoff describes the
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Table 3. Summary of Literature Review by Methodology
expected relationship with terrorist attacks. A classification tree was conducted based
upon terrorist attacks and their relationship to the type, strength, and stability of a
government [38]
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is helpful in determining important rela-
tionships between variables and the number of terrorist attacks. This technique was
used to identify the important socio-economic characteristics that have a relationship
with terrorist attacks in Southeast Turkey [32]. Additionally, this technique was cou-
pled with factor analysis to determine which countries are drivers of transnational
terrorism; terrorist activity in one or more countries serve as an indicator of terrorist
attacks at the global scale [33].
Table 3 summarizes the findings from the Gassebner and Luechinger survey paper
and additional studies from this literature review by methodology [1].
Clearly, the negative binomial is the standard for most analyses with well over
50% of the surveyed articles, but simply being used more does not mean it is the
most accurate model. The second most common model is the Tobit model, which
analyzes censored data; it is important to note that all eight articles include the
author S.B. Bloomberg [1]. Seven individuals used an ordinary least squares analysis
approach. It is interesting to note that many researchers conclude that the data
is not normally distributed and is not continuous since it is count data. If this is
true, both the Tobit and OLS models are inadequate techniques, since they both
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demand that errors are normally distributed with constant variance and a mean of
zero. Three articles also conducted a logistic model. This is a sensible technique,
but demands that a specified cutoff be used in the analysis. This cutoff could be a
specified number of attacks or whether or not attacks occur. Since the data suffers
from underreporting bias [30], it can be difficult to determine which numbers are truly
zero or truly small, and therefore, choosing a cutoff can be a very difficult process.
Additionally, this methodology does not predict the quantity of terrorist attacks. The
last commonly used methodology is mean comparison. This technique is very basic
and is fundementally used in almost all of the other common techniques.
Clearly, using the negative binomial regression is the most common technique used
in the literature analysis of terrorist attacks with socio-economic variables. The fact
that so many different researchers used the same methodology helps to validate the
methodology, but this does not mean it is the most appropiate methodology. It is
also important to note that the count for negative binomial does not specify between
the standard negative binomial distribution and the zero-inflated adaptation. These
last two points show the importance of conducting data specific analysis to determine
the most appropiate technique.
2.5 Model Selection Metrics
The performance of models, is gauged using certain metrics and statistical tests.
Through these metrics and statistical tests, it is possible to compare and contrast
different models to determine the best model.
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Metrics.
Akaike Information Criterion.
The first metric commonly used for model selection is Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). This metric balances how well a model fits the data with model complexity,
measured by the number of independent variables. The metric is based upon Equation
1,
AIC = −2 ln(L) + 2k (1)
where k is the number of parameters in the model and L is the maximized value for
the likelihood function [39]. A likelihood function is based upon information theory
and uses known outcome data to evaluate the relationship with independent data [40].
The log of the maximum of the likelihood function, which is commonly referred to as
the log-likelihood, simply scales the maximum value to allow for simpler derivation.
As seen above, the log-likelihood is multipled by negative two, while the number of
parameters is multiplied by positive two. Since a better model has a large likelihood
with fewer parameters, the better model has the lower value for AIC. This metric
only has an interpretation relative to another model’s metric.
Bayesian Information Criterion.
The second metric for model comparison is Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC).
Similar to AIC, BIC balances model fit and complexity, but instead is based upon
Equation 2,
BIC = −2 ln(L) + ln(n)k (2)
where k is the number of parameters in the model and L is the maximized value for
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the likelihood function just like AIC. The only difference between the two is k, the
number of parameters, is multiplied by the natural log of n, which is the data sample
size. Consequently, BIC gives more weight to model complexity relative to AIC as
long as there are more than seven data points. Just like AIC, the metric for BIC
must be compared relative to another model’s BIC calculation and the better model
has a smaller BIC.
Root Mean Square Error.
Another commonly used metric for model comparison is the root mean square
error. In regression, errors are synomous with a term referred to as a residual. Both
of these terms simply mean the difference between the prediction by the model and
the actual data. In order to assess the performance of a model, these errors are
commonly squared, to account for negatives and provide heavier weight to missed
data, and then summed into one metric. This one number is referred to as the sum of
square error (SSE). This number provides worse results for problems with more data
points, since their will be more error terms. Consequently, it is common to divide
SSE by the number of data points to get mean square error (MSE). Since the errors
were squared, the units for MSE are also squared. Consequently, it is common to take
the square root of the MSE to put units into easily interpretable terms. This metric
is called the RMSE and is the same calculation as the sample standard deviation. It
can be seen in Equation 3.
RMSE =
√∑n
t=1(yˆt − y)2
n
(3)
There are a few different applications of RMSE which relay different information
about the model. First, there is an RMSE based upon model fit. The RMSE based
upon model fit comes from the data used to build the model. This RMSE is con-
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structed to have the smallest SSE, because the model is built to have the smallest
error terms. When RMSE is calculated on validation data that was not used to create
the model, this metric really assesses the robustness and appropriateness of the model
in application to data outside of the sample used to construct the model. When the
RMSE is used in a cross-validation, the RMSE really addresses the predictive power
of the model, since the validation data is coming from a test set of data.
Log-likelihood Test.
While it is common to compare different metrics across model, there are also
instances when hypothesis testing can be used to determine the most appropriate
model. One of these hypothesis tests is the log-likelihood test. This test assesses two
models where one model is nested inside of the other. These models are compared
to see if the additional parameters are necessary to explain a difference in variation.
The hypothesis test has the following format:
Null Hypothesis: The simpler model is appropriate
Alternative Hypothesis: The general model is appropriate
The test statistic is distributed χ2, where the degrees of freedom is equivalent to
the difference in the number of parameters between the two models. This statistic is
easily turned into a p-value to determine which model is more appropriate.
Cross-Validation.
Finding relationships between specific variables and terrorist attacks is useful to
better understanding terrorist attacks, but in order for this information to be useful
and not by chance correlated, these relationships must have predictive power. Finding
relationships with predictive power, provides a gateway to shaping policies that affect
the variable, and consequently, affect terrorism.
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In order to evaluate predictive power of any model, we must first fit the model, then
make a prediction and finally estimate the prediction error. “The most widely used
method for estimating prediction error is cross-validation” [41]. Validation, involves
a subset of the data used to evaluate the predictive capability of the model. However,
when data are scarce, another validation techniques is k-fold cross-validation.
K-fold cross-validation splits the data into k independent portions. A model is
constructed based upon all of the portions except one, and that last portion of the
data is used for validation. This process continues until all portions of the data have
been used for validation. The value used for k should be chosen carefully, as this
value balances the amount of variance and bias in the model. If k is equivalent to the
number of data points, this technique is called a leave-one-out cross-validation and
minimizes bias, while having the most variance between the k validations [41].
One large challenge with k-fold cross-validation is that the data must be split into
k independent portions. This is impossible to do when the data are dependent upon
each other as it usually is in most time-based prediction scenerios. In order to cope
with this issue, it is common to use another technique called blocked cross-validation.
Blocked Cross-Validation.
Blocked cross-validation divides the data into identically distributed, but not in-
dependent blocks [42]. In time-based models, these blocks are usually one or more
time steps. The first block is used to build a model, which is validated with the second
block. Then both of these blocks are used to build a model that validates the third
block. This process continues until the final block of data is validated. This technique
produces predictive errors at every time step, in order to analyze the predicitve power
of the model.
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III. Confirmatory Analysis
3.1 Overview
This chapter investigates the first research question from Section 1.3:
• Can the qualitative relationships considered indicators of terrorism be quanti-
tatively supported with a generalized linear model?
3.2 Data Collection
The charachteristics of terrorism outlined in “Pre-incident Indicators of Terrorist
Attacks: Weak Economies and Fragile Political Infrastructure Bring Rise to Terrorist
Organizations and Global Networks”, by Carter, is quantitatively assessed in this
chapter. This article identified five indicators that claim to serve as pre-incident
indicators of terrorism and are summarized in Section 2.4. It is important to note that
Carter’s analysis draws on social science literature. This chapter statistically tests
the indicators indentified by Carter, to see if they can be quantitatively supported.
To quantitatively support the findings in Carter’s article, we use data that accurately
depicts modern day terrorist attacks and data that accurately represents Carter’s five
factors.
Terrorism Data.
The data representing terrorist attacks came from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD), maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Re-
sponses to Terrorism (START). This database contains a list of terrorist attacks
dating back to 1970. To be considered a terrorist attack, an event must meet the
inclusion criteria for the GTD. This inclusion criteria is based on the consortium’s
definition of terrorism, which can be found in Section 2.1.
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This data was collected using an extensive review of publicly available, unclassi-
fied, open source materials. These materials include media articles, electronic news
articles, existing data sets, books, journals, and legal documents [11]. Only events
that meet the aforementioned inclusion criteria are recorded as terrorist attacks in
the GTD.
For this research, the event data was the aggregated number of terrorist attacks
occurring in a year (1 Jan to 31 Dec) for each African country.
Factor Data.
Data is needed to evaluate Carter’s five factors. Since Carter’s factors reference
concepts and ideas instead of quantitative measurements, each factor is represented
by a proxy variable. The source and selection processes for these proxy variables are
described below.
Poverty.
Poverty is commonly analyzed in terrorism research using GDP per capita as
a proxy variable. Despite the common use of GDP per capita, it is a poor proxy
for poverty, especially when better alternatives are available. GDP per capita does
not describe as much about poverty as it does the ratio of economic output to the
population. Additionally, GDP per capita does not state anything about the actual
spread of the country’s wealth, but assumes that it is equal. Past research found the
Gini Index, which measures income inequality, statistically significant, the assumption
of equal distribution of wealth is unlikely to be valid. The Gini Index does not measure
poverty, but income inequality, and therefore, is a poor proxy for Carter’s definition.
The proxy variable for poverty used is the percentage of people living below a $2
a day poverty line. This indicator choice is believed to better represent true poverty
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and provides an equivalent cutoff for all countries. An alternative could be to use the
national poverty line, but it is inconsistent from country to country. This data came
from the World Bank.
Lack of Border Control.
There are no intuitive databases describing border security between countries in
Africa, especially as assessment that changed over time. Consideration was given
to analyzing migration rates, tariff rates, and even illegal drug or arms trade data
were considered as potential proxy variables. However, all of these data sets were
unreliable, not readily accessible, or did not truly represent border control as a proxy
variable.
The Fragile State Index ranks countries to determine which countries are weak
or failing. In order to do this they “convert millions of pieces of information into a
form that is relevant as well as easily digestible and informative [43].” These millions
of pieces of information are quantified into over one hundred sub-indicators, which
are aggregated to 12 main indicators, which are once again aggregated to form the
overall country score. These 12 main indicators examine social, economic, political,
and military examples including uneven economic development, external intervention,
and public services to name a few [43].
The security apparatus indicator measures the “extent to which the social contract
is weakened by competing groups, which is a proxy measure of security in a country
[43]. While this indicator does not speak to border control, every border is shared
by two or more countries. By looking at the surrounding countries, more insight into
border control is provided. Therefore, the indicator for border security is the sum
product of the bordering country’s security apparatus score and the percentage of
border shared with that country. For example, the United States score would be the
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security apparatus score for Canada multiplied by the percent of land border shared
with Canada plus the security apparatus score for Mexico multiplied by the percent
of land border shared with Mexico.
Political Corruption.
The proxy for political corruption comes from state legitimacy indicator of the
Fragile State Index. State legitimacy measures the“corruption and lack of represen-
tativeness in the government” [43].
Economic Fragility.
A proxy for economic fragility is the economic vulnerability index built by the
United Nations and Ferdi. This index measures the “structural vulnerability of coun-
tries to exogenous economic and environmental shocks” [44]. This proxy better ap-
proximates economic fragility as opposed to other proxies such as integration into
global economy, international trade, or GDP. Consequently, it more adequately rep-
resents economic fragility.
Social Fragmentation.
The proxy for social fragmentation comes from group grievance indicator of the
Fragile State Index. Group grievance measures the “tension and violence exists be-
tween groups” [43]. The benefit of using this index as opposed to other indicators
is that this measure includes ethnic, religious, and power fragmentation, instead of
focusing on one type of fragmentation.
3.3 Data Treatment
All collected data were processed prior to analysis.
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Missing Data.
Data was specifically chosen for its availability. However, some of the five factor
data contained missing values. These missing values were a result of the Fragile State
Index not evaluating the country or from World Bank and the United Nations not
collecting or reporting data every year.
In order to fill these missing values, the k nearest neighbors data imputation tech-
nique was used. This technique looks across the multivariate space at the statistically
closest data points to the missing data point based upon Mahalanobis distance. The
missing data point is estimated based upon a weighted average of a specified num-
ber of points. This analysis used the ten closest points for data imputation, k=10,
which is commonly used and the default for the “impute” package in R. Only two
independent variables, EVI and poverty, were missing values. EVI had 49 missing
data points, which is about a 15% of the data. However, poverty was missing ap-
proximately 80% of the data points. Since both variables were related to economic
condition of the country, GDP per capita was temporarily appended to the dataset
in order to have more accurate imputations based upon economic data and then re-
moved before analysis. This technique successfully filled the data set with reasonable
values allowing the analysis to continue unabated.
Data Standardization.
Lastly, the data was standardized to simplify comparisons. Additionally, stan-
dardizing and mean-correcting help address potential multicollinearity issues within
the data. Consequently, the data was both mean differenced and corrected for vari-
ance.
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3.4 Scope and Assumptions
This section outlines both the assumptions and scope of the problem.
Analysis of Africa.
Much research has been conducted on terrorism at the global level and at the
small regional level such as south-eastern Turkey and specific states within the U.S.
Conducting research at the global level does not find relationships that are specific to
a region. Some research has attempted to use dummy variables to find these regional
trends; however, using a dummy variable does not account for the effect of each
growth determinant [5]. Conducting analysis at the regional level provides specific
relationships, but is not robust to general trends or applicable to a large area. For
the reasons outlined in Section 1.2, the continent of Africa was the clear choice for
this analysis.
Country Removal.
Currently, Africa contains 53 countries including the surrounding islands. The
country of South Sudan came into existence in 2011 and was removed from the dataset
due to a lack of data for both the dependent and independent variables. For this study
Sudan and South Sudan are aggregated for both independent and dependent data.
South Sudan is used seperately in the analysis when calculating spatial variables, such
as border security, for its bordering countries. Future analysis should include South
Sudan as an independent country due to its lack of stability based upon being the
most fragile state in 2014 [43]. Additionally, some states are very small based upon
population. Further examination of these countries shows that the majority of them
do not have an autonomous government or are in heavily disputed territory. In order
to reduce the effect of the analysis being dependent upon countries outside of Africa
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or issues related to small population, all countries with current populations less than
a million are removed except for Djibouti. Since Djibouti is strategically significant
to the United States, has an autonomous government, and is the closest country to
the million population cutoff, it is retained in the model. This results in 49 African
countries in the analysis.
Analysis Time Period.
Lastly, it is important to define the time period that the analysis will span. The
GTD contains event data back to February 1968 to 2013, except for the year 1993.
However, terrorism has drastically changed over this time period. David Kilcullen
stated that modern terrorists differ significantly in “policy, strategy, operational art,
and tactical technique,” as well as wealth and urbanization compared to past terrorist
organizations [2]. To get an accurate depiction of modern terrorism, it is important
to analyze terrorism in recent times. Since this analysis is focused upon Africa, it is
vital to analyze factors which shape terrorism in Africa. Two large events occurred in
2007 that caused a shift in Africa and in terrorism across the continent. In February
2007, the AFRICOM combat command was created, showing increased U.S. interest
in Africa [6]. Also in 2007, the U.S. troop surge in Iraq supporting operation eduring
freedom and operation Iraqi freedom was implemented. This increase of troops was
viewed by many as successful in dealing with terrorism based upon a decrease in U.S.
troop fatalities and terrorist attacks in Iraq. This means that terrorists were either
placed on the defensive or escaped to other countries. Either way, this event effected
terrorism on both a global and regional scale. Due to these events and the desire to
analyze recent terrorism, the analysis time period will go from 1 Jan 2007 until 31
Dec 2013.
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3.5 Methodology
Model Types.
While methodology among terrorism studies ranges from systems thinking [35] to
Principal Component Analysis [5, 32], many researchers choose to conduct regression
techniques. Within regression techniques, researchers commonly use a Poisson, a
negative binomial, or a zero-inflated negative binomial regression, with the negative
binomial regressions being the most popular [1]. A negative binomial regression is
very similar to linear regression. However, instead of assuming that the residuals are
normally distributed, the assumption is that the residuals are negatively binomially
distributed. This means that the probability mass function is defined by Equation 4
[45],
Pr(X = k) =
(
r
r + µ
)r
Γ(r + k)
k! Γ(r)
(
µ
r + µ
)k
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . (4)
where µ is the mean, µ+ µ
2
r
is the variance, and r is the dispersion parameter. Unlike
a Poisson regression model, the mean is not equivalent to the variance for the negative
binomial, which is mainly driven by the dispersion parameter. For this data, µ=16
and σ2=3,250 The dispersion parameter is calculated with the Iteratively Reweighted
Least Squares (IRLS) algorithm. This algorithm finds the maximum likelihood es-
timates of a glm by iteratively solving a weighted least squares problem to find the
dispersion parameter. The independent data is assumed to be independent from each
other, which was confirmed by VIF scores less than 5, before mean-correcting the
data. The incident, or dependent, data is assumed to be approximately stationary;
meaning the variance between years is relatively low. Additionally, the dependent
data in a negative binomial regression is log-linked to the independent data, which is
equivalent to conducting a log transformation upon the model.
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There are also zero-inflated versions of the Poisson and negative binomial regres-
sions. These regressions are the same as the basic regressions, but add a logistic
regression which splits the data into zero and non-zero values. This remedies regres-
sion errors due to excessive zeros. A histogram of the distribution of terrorist attacks
can be seen in Figure 3. Clearly, the data contains numerous zeros, however, it is
unclear if the amount of zeros demands the zero-inflated negative binomial or if the
standard negative binomial distribution captures this quantity of zeros.
Figure 3. Occurence histogram of annual terrorist attacks
Model Evaluation.
Table 4 shows the results of the negative binomial regression using a full model, the
zero-inflated negative binomial regression, a Poisson regression and the zero-inflated
Poisson regression. The metrics in this table are described in Section 2.5.
Based upon AIC, the negative binomial regressions drastically outperform the
Poisson models. BIC cannot be calculated for zero-inflated models, but these results
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Table 4. Model comparisons among methodologies
once again show the negative binomial outperforming the Poisson regression. Lastly,
in regards to the RMSE, the zero-inflated models perform poorly relative to the
models without the zero-inflated portion. From an initial overall perspective, the
negative binomial model seems to outperform the two Poisson models in terms of
AIC, while it outperforms the two zero-inflated models from the RMSE perspective.
There are many reasons why some researchers have chosen to include the zero-
inflated portion of the regression, while others have foregone it. Some of these reasons
include knowledge of the zero-inflated portion and differences in the actual data set
used. As the distribution previously showed, the data contains many zeros, but a
comparison of both regression techniques must be conducted to determine if the data
is truly zero-inflated.
In comparing the negative binomial (NB) regression to its zero-inflated counter-
part, the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) has a slightly lower AIC indicating
a slightly better fitting model. However, analyzing the RMSE clearly shows the NB
dominant to the ZINB; indicating NB is the better prediction model. Consequently,
the data are best regressed upon using the negative binomial regression. This is likely
due to the more recent time frame of this analysis in contrast to other research in
the field. Since 1996, the average number of terrorist attacks has increased more
than six-fold at the global level [3]. Also, this analysis has a lower proportion of
zeros than other research which commonly analyze terrorism as far back as 1968.
Additionally, since the analysis only looks at countries in Africa in contrast to the
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entire world. African countries may be less likely to report zero terrorist attacks than
other countries around the world due to the lack of media control and the amount
of foreign intervention. This causes less zero values in the data. While including
the zero-inflated portion may be appropriate with other data sets, inclusion with this
prediction model and variables did not yield the best results. Therefore, a negative
binomial regression is used to analyze the data.
Results.
The results of the negative binomial regression are seen in Table 5. It is important
to note that the inverse of the dispersion parameter, r, is represented by θ in the table.
It’s signifigance shows that the data is over-dispersed and the Negative Binomial is
more appropiate than the Poisson regression.
When using regression techniques, it can be very difficult to differentiate between
correlation and causation. This research is focused upon factors which can act as
indicators of terrorism. In order to better analyze this relationship, each of the
independent variables is lagged one year. For instance, terrorist attacks in 2007
are regressed on factor data from 2006. Therefore, the time for analyzing terrorist
attacks will be from 2007 to 2013, but the independent variables will range from 2006
to 2012. This table shows all model factors with the exception of poverty significant
at α=.05. This shows that economic vulnerability, border security, fragmentation,
and corruption are significant indicators of terrorism vulnerability.
3.6 Model Robustness
This model is also compared to the same model removing one factor at a time.
These results are in Table 6. The best two models are retaining all factors and
retaining all factors except for poverty. These two models have relatively equivalent
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Table 5. Negative Binomial Regression Results
Dependent variable:
yterr
EVI −0.361∗∗
(0.143)
Border.Security 0.402∗∗
(0.164)
Fragmented 1.207∗∗∗
(0.158)
Corruption 0.401∗∗
(0.160)
Poverty.percent.below.2USD −0.169
(0.133)
Constant 1.661∗∗∗
(0.130)
Observations 343
Log Likelihood −797.135
θ 0.197∗∗∗ (0.019)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,606.270
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6. Model comparisons witholding variables
performance, but it interesting to note that a log-likelihood test, addressed in Section
2.5, recommended the model without poverty with a p-value of 0.366.
As seen in Table 5, poverty does not have a significant relationship with the
number of terrorist attacks. In the literature, much debate exists over whether or
not a relationship exists between poverty and terrorism. However, those who do find
a relationship, usually conclude that the relationship is small, so it is not surprising
that poverty was not found to be a significant indicator of terrorism.
Interestingly, economic fragility appears to have a negative relationship with the
number of terrorist attacks which is significant at α = .05. This disagrees with
Carter’s explanation, which could be attributed to the use of a proxy variable. We
believe this relationship occurs due to more stable, less fragile, economies serve as
targets on the African continent.
Additionally, the proxy variables based upon the Fragile State Index are all sta-
tistically significant. It is important to remember that the higher component score
on the Fragile State Index indicates higher fragility. Therefore, lack of border con-
trol has a significantly positive relationship with the number of terrorist attacks at
α = .05. This makes intuitive sense, but is the first time this relationship has been
quantitatively supported. As fragmentation increases, the number of terrorist attacks
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Table 7. Blocked cross-validation root mean square error results
significantly increase at α = .01. This also makes sense and agrees with the current
literature. A similar relationship exists between corruption and the number of terror-
ist attacks except this relationship is only significant at α = .05. This relationship is
also intuitive and is supported in the literature as well.
3.7 Blocked Cross-Validation
As mentioned in Section 2.5, blocked cross-validation provides a systematic method
to measure prediction error when data are both dependent and scarce. Therefore, a
blocked cross-validation was conducted using years as the blocks. First, this analysis
was conducted using the full model. Then, one of the five variables was removed and
the blocked cross-validation was reconducted in order to see the difference in models
using a subset of the variables. The results are in Table 7.
As expected, removing the variables with highly significant relationships causes an
increase in RMSE, while removing weak relationships does not have a drastic impact
on RMSE. For instance, removing fragmentation causes an increase in RMSE, while
removing poverty improves the predictive power of the model.
Overtime, the model clearly loses predictive power as the RMSEs for 2012 and
2013 are drastically higher than in earlier years. Since blocked cross-validation builds
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the full model in time increments, a truly predictive model would exhibit a decrease
in RMSE or at least RMSE would remain relatively the same as more time increments
are included. Since the cross-validation RMSEs drastically increase after 2011, this
model lacks predictive power. Additionally, a RMSE is interpreted to provide a rough
range of prediction. Even the smallest RMSE values are greater than 20 and the
largest exceed 90 terrorist attacks per country per year. In regards to this problem,
over or under predicting the annual number of terrorist attacks for a single country
by 50 attacks can have drastic consequences and these problems only become worse
as the RMSE increases.
There are a few potential reasons for this lack in predictive capability. First,
it is important to recall that proxies for Carter’s five factors were analyzed, since
the idealogical concepts could not be quantitatively tested. Second, Carter’s factors
come from an analysis of countries on the Arabian peninsula and the horn of Africa,
while this paper looks at Africa collectively. Third, while many of Carter’s factors
were useful in predicting terrorism, there are likely to be additional variables that
can improve the predictive capability. Regardless, this model lacks predictive power,
especially to an extent for countries to adequately prepare for the upcoming year.
An accurate predictive model is important as decisions are made on where to focus
military aid, diplomatic attention, and other resources to counter the terrorism threat
in Africa. Therefore, the other research questions will be addressed with the hope of
improving the predictive power of the model.
3.8 Conclusion
Except for poverty, Carter’s five factors appear to be significant indicators of
terrorist attacks. This successfully answers the first question posed in Section 1.3.
However, it is important to note that this model lacks predictive power, as the pre-
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dictions have a large error range. Therefore, it is now important to answer the other
research questions and explore or further examine new and existing factors and their
potential relationships with the number of terrorist attacks in Chapter 4. This anal-
ysis seeks greater insight into terrorism in Africa yielding a more accurate predictive
model.
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IV. Exploratory Analysis
4.1 Overview
This chapter answers the second proposed research question from Section 1.3:
• Can other potential indicators of terrorism be quantitatively explored and sup-
ported with a generalized linear model?
Similar to Chapter III, data collection and data treatment are conducted. The
scope, assumptions, and methodology remain the same for this analysis in order to
maintain consistency. Next, the analysis is conducted including a time blocked cross-
validation to measure predictive power.
4.2 Data Collection
To explore other potential indicators of terrorism, data that accurately describes
these indicators are found and aggregated. This section details the selected indicators,
the chosen proxy variables, and their data sources. As described in Section 3.3, the
missing data are filled using the k-nearest neighbors imputation method and then the
independent data are mean-corrected and standardized.
Population.
A survey paper written by Krieger and Meierrieks [34] found fourteen articles
that found a positive relationship between population and terrorist attacks. No other
relationship in the survey paper had more articles in agreement than the positive
relationship between population and terrorism. Some of these articles suggested that
population be included in any analysis to control for the effect of population upon
the number of attacks. Population statistics come from the World Bank database.
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Population Density.
In Section 2.3, the indicators that the Department of Homeland Security uses as
indicators of terrorism are discussed. One of these indicators is population density,
since there is the desire to conduct attacks on these concentrated target centers.
Consequently, this indicator is included to evaluate how well population density serves
as an indicator of terrorism. Population density statistics come from the World Bank
database and are the average number of people per square kilometer of land in the
country.
Unemployment.
Another commonly researched indicator is unemployment, however, many articles
come to conflicting conclusions regarding the statistic. One potential reason for these
disparate results is different data sources with different definitions of unemployment.
In numerous databases, individual countries define unemployment differently. These
different definitions cause the countries to be compared to each other based upon
different scales. To remedy this problem, the unemployment data are projections
from the International Labor Organization, which uses one common definition and
evaluates across the entire world. The data comes from the World Bank database
and is recorded as the percentage of people unemployed in the country.
There is a difference between unemployed and underemployed, where the latter
are individuals working at a level where they are drastically overqualified. Data
representing underemployment were not accessible through direct or indirect means
where the integrity of the data was consistent with the rest of the variables. How-
ever, in future research, it would be interesting to explore the relationship between
underemployment and terrorism, if reputable data could be collected.
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Military Expenditure.
In terrorism research, it is common to analyze the level of democracy or the type of
government. One common problem with these analyses is that the level of democracy
is a subjective measure or the type of government can be drastically different when
comparing the official type of government with the subjective opinion of how the
country is actually governed. In Li’s analysis, the level of democracy is broken into
constituent parts and analyzed to determine the effect of democracy through the
constituent parts [29]. Another important aspect of government is the importance of
the military. In order to assess the importance of the military to the government,
the percentage of GDP spent on the military is assessed. This data comes from the
World Bank database.
Education Expenditure.
Another important aspect of the government and a commonly debated indicator
in terrorism research is education. In order to gauge the level and importance of
education in a country, the percentage of GDP spent on education is assessed. The
data comes from the World Bank database.
Urbanization.
In Section 2.3, modern terrorists are shown to both hide and conduct their oper-
ations in cities. Therefore, it follows that countries with higher levels of urbanization
could potentially have more terrorist attacks. In order to analyze this belief, the
level of urbanization in a country is analyzed. The data comes from the World Bank
database and is the percentage of people living in urban areas.
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Life Expectancy.
Life expectancy is the average age a newborn infant would live if prevailing pat-
terns at the time of birth were to remain constant throughout its life and can serve
as an indicator of the conditions in a country, such as medical, sanitary, and security.
The relation, if any, to terrorism is explored. The data comes from the World Bank
database.
Gender Equality.
How a country treats women and the opportunities that women have can be
very descriptive. To analyze the relationship with terrorism, an indicator of gender
equality is included in the model. This indicator is the ratio of girls to boys enrolled
in secondary education and comes from the World Bank database. Data addressing
the population gender ratio or the gender ratio in the work place would be interesting
to analyze for future analysis. However, analyzing the ratio in secondary education
shows more than the number of females to males, but also addresses women’s rights,
especially education, in these countries. Consequently, this metric will be used to
assess gender equality.
Freedom of the Press.
Since the GTD’s data collection process uses open media sources to find terrorist
attacks, a Freedom of the Press index is used to control for countries with closed
media sources. The index used comes from Freedom House, which is the same source
used by Drakos and Li [30, 29].
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Foreign Intervention.
It is interesting to look at the relationship between foreign intervention and ter-
rorist attacks as well. The data for foreign intervention is a sub-indicator from the
Fragile State Index called external intervention. External intervention is defined as
the effect of other countries upon the country of interest.
Oil Production.
Our review of the literature determined that oil production has not been analyzed
with regards to terrorism. While not applicable to the whole world, this variable could
highlight a relationship specific to the African continent. This data for this indicator
comes from U.S. Department of Energy and looks at total annual oil production in
average thousand barrels per day.
Carter’s Factors.
Also included in this model are four of five of the factors analyzed in Chapter
three. The four factors include economic fragility, lack of border control, political
corruption, and social fragmentation. Poverty was not included in this model due
to the data imputation, since poverty had the most missing data points of any other
variable, almost 80%. Furthermore, this variable was found to be insignificant in both
the Chapter III model, as well as other research in the field [34]. Additionally, research
specific to finding the relationship between poverty and terrorism has already been
thoroughly conducted. The results are that poverty and terrorism do not have a strong
relationship. Lastly, in a practical sense, witholding poverty from the model reduces
the amount of data necessary to conduct the analysis, which allows an additional
variable to be analyzed.
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Contagion.
Lastly, contagion is well founded in the terrorism literature [34, 1]. Contagion is
an autoregressive component, specifically a lag term. Most articles only analyze one
lag of the dependent variable, but this research analyzes two lags of the dependent
variable. These lag terms are simply the number of terrorist attacks in the same
country from the previous year or two. In order to maintain consistency, this data
comes from the GTD.
4.3 Results
In order to find robust, accurate, and predictive indicators of terrorism, multiple
iterations of model construction were undertaken. The following sections report the
model, block cross-validation, and the reasoning for constructing the model. Then a
comparison of the models is conducted.
Full Model and Blocked Cross-Validation.
The results of the full model can be seen in Table 8.
At α = .05, unemployment, freedom of the press and the two year lag are sig-
nificant, with freedom of the press having a negative relationship. Other research
commonly finds a positive relationship between terrorism and freedom of the press
due to the data collection process, however, this research analyzed the whole world
and start analysis in 1968. In Africa since 2007, freedom of the press allows citizens
to express their political disdain through other means than terrorism, so the presence
of freedom of the press indicates less terrorism. At α = .01, population, education ex-
penditure, life expectancy, gender equality, foreign intervention, fragmentation, and
the one year lag are all significant with gender equality exhibiting a negative relation-
ship and the largest absolute effect on terrorism. Consequently, countries providing
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Table 8. Comparison of Models using All Variables
Dependent variable:
Terrorist Attacks
Full Model Full Model without outliers
Population 0.498∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.108)
Population.Density 0.087 0.216
(0.147) (0.152)
Unemployment 0.350∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.142)
Military −0.109 −0.223∗
(0.117) (0.124)
Education 0.750∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.146)
Urbanization 0.199 0.204
(0.134) (0.138)
Life.Expectancy 0.539∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.140)
Gender.Equality −0.793∗∗∗ −0.764∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.138)
Freedom.of.the.Press −0.297∗∗ −0.279∗∗
(0.123) (0.125)
Foreign.Intervention 0.687∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.151)
EVI −0.078 −0.122
(0.119) (0.120)
Border.Security 0.187 0.250∗
(0.146) (0.151)
Fragmentation 0.606∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.150)
Corruption 0.013 0.001
(0.143) (0.139)
Oil.Production 0.098 0.047
(0.139) (0.139)
One.yr.lag 0.478∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.175)
Two.yr.lag 0.396∗∗ 0.018
(0.157) (0.178)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 9. Comparison of Blocked Cross-Validation Results across models
secondary education opportunities to women seem able to decrease terrorism more
than if that country had high border security or greater military expenditure.
In Table 12, the blocked cross-validation results can be seen for all of the models.
Each variable has the parameter estimate, the variance below the estimate, and nota-
tion depicting significance level. Clearly, this model lacks predictive capability. First,
due to the data requirements of the IRLS algorithm to approximate theta, which is
based upon the number of variables in the independent data, the models for 2008 and
2009 could not be constructed. Second, validation residuals are high due to misfitting
the model. The model predicting 2013 attacks (using 2007-2012 data) predicts 6.4
million terrorist attacks for Nigeria and over 17 thousand for Somalia. Since the high-
est number of attacks in the dataset is 597 (Nigeria 2012), these estimates drastically
increase the error term. Before conducting any analysis, the countries of Nigeria and
Somalia were considered outliers in regards to the dependent variable. These two
countries represent the top 5% of terrorist attacks on average for Africa in this time
period, which can be seen in Figure 4.
Being in the top 5% does not make them outliers by themselves, however, their
averages of 202 attacks for Somalia and 194 attacks for Nigeria grossly outweigh
Algeria, the country with the third largest average of 74 attacks. These countries are
clearly outliers in terrorist attacks and essentially leverage the model parameters to
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Figure 4. Cumulative Distribution of African Countries by 2007-2013 Average Annual
Terrorist Attacks
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get the best fits. In order to remedy this problem, these countries are removed from
the model and the model is rerun. While it is undesirable to remove countries from
the model, it is the interest of this research to determine the relationships between
terrorism throughout all of Africa and these indicators, not only Nigeria and Somalia.
Additionally, this model should help countries predict the extent of their vulnerability
to terrorism in order to prepare for the attacks. Countries like Somalia and Nigeria
can expect consistently large amount of terrorist attacks at least in the near future.
Therefore, removing Somalia and Nigeria from the model does not compromise the
main purpose of the model.
Full Model with Nigeria and Somalia removed and Blocked Cross-
Validation.
The results of the full model with Nigeria and Somalia removed can be seen in
the left column of Table 8. Removing outliers caused border security and military
expenditure to become significant in the model with α = .10, where military expendi-
ture has a negative relationship with terrorism. Additionally, the removal of outliers
causes the two year lag to no longer be significant and almost doubles the effect of
the one year lag causing it to be the greatest indicator of terrorism incidents. This
indicates the level of activity seen in the previous year is likely to continue. Lastly,
unemployment became significant at α = .01.
In Table 12, the blocked cross-validation results can be seen for all of the models.
This model clearly outperforms the full model in regards to predictive capability. The
root mean square error (RMSE) of approximately 30 indicates that predictions are
likely to be within 30 incidents. Without considering the year 2013, the model has
an RMSE of approximately 12 incidents. Thirty incidents, while much smaller than
the full model, is still a very wide range for predicting terrorist attacks, especially
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considering the effects of one terrorist attack. Consequently, it was decided to conduct
a backward stepwise regression based upon AIC to construct the model and then
validate the smaller model.
Reduced Model and Blocked Cross-Validation.
Using a stepwise regression that minimizes AIC, a reduced model is constructed.
The reduced model can be seen in Table 10. Unemployment, urbanization, freedom
of the press, and the two year lag are significant at α = .05 with freedom of the press
maintaining a negative relationship. All of the variables that are significant at α =
.01 in the full model are still significant at that level, with gender equality having a
negative relationship with the largest absolute relationship with terrorism.
One particular variable that was not included in the analysis was a spatial com-
ponent, or analyzing the terrorism occurring in neighboring countries. Looking at
Figure 4 the countries with more terrorist attacks tend to border each other. In order
to assess if this is true, a variable that measures the spatial component is constructed.
This variable was constructed similarly to border security, but used one year lag val-
ues instead of the security apparatus score. The number of attacks that occurred
in neighboring countries is multiplied by the percentage of border shared with that
country. Then, these numbers are aggregated for all of the bordering countries of the
focal country. This variable is essentially a spatial autoregressive component and is
added to the reduced model with the results in Table 11.
In Table 12, the blocked cross-validation results can be seen for all of the models.
This model performs poorly in terms of prediction for the same reason behind the
poor performance of the full model with outliers. This model has fewer indicators,
which means that fewer indicators have to be monitored in the future. Addition-
ally, the smaller dimensionality of the problem allowed blocked cross-validation to be
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conducted for every year.
Table 10. Comparison of Models using stepwise process
Dependent variable:
Terrorist Attacks
Reduced Model Reduced Model without outliers
Population 0.562∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.101)
Unemployment 0.261∗∗ 0.289∗∗
(0.128) (0.117)
Education 0.728∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.132)
Urbanization 0.255∗∗
(0.119)
Life.Expectancy 0.550∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.128)
Gender.Equality −0.802∗∗∗ −0.710∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.133)
Freedom.of.the.Press −0.290∗∗ −0.229∗∗
(0.117) (0.117)
Foreign.Intervention 0.651∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.133)
Border.Security 0.247∗
(0.139)
Fragmentation 0.687∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.135)
One.yr.lag 0.511∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.093)
Two.yr.lag 0.371∗∗
(0.153)
Constant 0.848∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.103)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Reduced Model with Nigeria and Somalia removed and Blocked Cross-
Validation.
Conducting a separate stepwise regression minimizing AIC created the reduced
model with the outliers, Nigeria and Somalia, removed can be seen in Table 10. Com-
pared to the reduced model with outliers, urbanization and the two year lag are no
longer significant at α = .10. This makes sense since these countries have had sus-
tained terrorism problems and Nigeria has the greatest amount of urbanization due to
the only mega-city in Africa, Lagos. Furthermore, border security became significant
at α = .10, which shows that border security is an important indicator of terrorism
in Africa excluding Somalia and Nigeria. Otherwise all other indicators maintain
the same significance level and relationship direction. However, the actual parameter
estimates do change causing the one year lag to have the greatest relationship with
terrorism.
Similar to the previous model, a spatial autoregressive component is added to the
reduced model with the results in Table 11.
In Table 12, the blocked cross-validation results are summarized for all of the
models. This model performs better than any other model. The total RMSE is ap-
proximately 25 incidents and approximately 10 without the year 2013. Furthermore,
this model has fewer indicators, which means that fewer indicators have to be moni-
tored in the future. Additionally, the smaller dimensionality of the problem allowed
conducting blocked cross-validation for every year.
Model Comparisons.
It is worth discussing the poor predictive performance of the year 2013 models.
All of the models grossly miss predicted the number of terrorist attacks in the year
2013 during blocked cross-validation. It is important to note that 2013 saw a drastic
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increase in terrorism across much of Africa. Djibouti recorded 196 more attacks than
the previous 6 years combined. Libya recorded 173 more attacks than the previous 6
years combined and Mozambique recorded 14 more attacks than the previous 6 years
combined. This sharp increase in attacks shows the growing problem of terrorism
throughout Africa. Additionally, it shows that the year 2013 stands out in compar-
ison to the other years in the model due to the much larger scale of terrorism. It is
believed this 2013 increase changed the semi-stationary temporal nature of the inci-
dents; meaning the variance in the incidents was too great for this model to predict
accurately.
In order to assess why the model does not capture the drastic changes in 2013,
the reduced model without outliers predictions for 2013 is examined. A map of the
predictions by this model can be seen in Figure 5.
Only three countries had predictions off by more than 60 (Djibouti, Libya, and
Kenya) and 90% of countries fell within the RMSE of 25 attacks. Djibouti had
263 attacks more than predicted. While the model predicted a slight increase from
the previous, it did not capture the extent of the increase. It is believed that this
changed occurred due to increased foreign military presence, especially by the United
States. The model predicted a doubling of the attacks from 2012 for Libya, but
it was still under predicted by 195 attacks. It is believed this occurred due to the
change in government with the removal of Gaddafi. Kenya’s number of attacks for
2013 stayed the same, but the model predicted 191 more attacks. When looking at
the data, a lot of indicators changed slightly indicating more attacks. These slight
increases when aggregated vastly over-estimated the 2013 prediction. It is believed
more data would have prevented this problem by fine-tuning the data. In conclusion,
this model can still be improved upon. A predictive model that is off by approximately
25 attacks is better than no model, but has a large amount of variability to make
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Figure 5. 2013 Model Predictions for Reduced Model without Outliers
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Table 11. Comparison of All Models Including Spatial Component
practical decisions. Consequently, in future research it is recommended to include
foreign military presence, changes in government, and include more terrorism data as
it becomes available.
In Table 11, the different attributes of the models are compared. As mentioned
previously the reduced model without Nigeria and Somalia outperformed the other
models in predictive capability and dimensionality. Additionally, reduced model with-
out Nigeria and Somalia outperformed the other models in regards to AIC and BIC.
Furthermore, a likelihood-ratio test, which is discussed in Section 2.5, between the
models without outliers indicate that the reduced model is superior with a p-value
of .540. It is also interesting to note that reduced model without outliers improves
the model fit and cuts the RMSE in half when compared to the best model from the
confirmatory analysis.
The fit of the model and the cross-validation RMSE without 2013 perform slightly
worse with the addition of the spatial component. Additionally, the spatial component
is not statistically significant when added to the reduced model with or without
outliers. However, the addition of the spatial component does improve the overall
cross-validation results. In order to analyze what is occurring. The SSE for the
time-blocked cross-validation can be seen in Table 12.
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Table 12. Comparison of All Models by Cross-Validation Including Spatial Component
It appears that including the spatial component makes predictions worse for 2008,
201,0 and 2011, the best years of prediction for the reduced model without outliers.
However, it predicts much better in 2012 and 2013, which are the worst predictions for
the reduced model without outliers. Therefore, it appears that the spatial component
is growing in importance as an indicator. This can be seen by comparing the average
number of attacks for the entire data set (Figure 4) and the predictions for 2013
(Figure 5).
It is believed that there is not enough modern data to cause the spatial component
to be significant. However, when more data is available, adding this component to
future analysis would likely improve predictive capability and especially address the
worse predictions in recent years.
4.4 Conclusion
The reduced model removing outliers performs best compared to the other mod-
els. The variables population, education, life expectancy, gender equality, foreign
intervention, fragmentation, and the one year lag have a robust relationship with
terrorism. This model answers the second research question. To answer the third
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research question, these relationships are analyzed using classification.
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V. Classification
5.1 Overview
The third and final research question proposed in Section 1.3:
• Can these variable relationships undergo classification methods, such as classifi-
cation trees, in order to determine breakpoints in socio-economic characteristics
of countries, which indicate increased vulnerability to terror attacks?
To answer this question, classification trees are constructed and analyzed. Clas-
sification trees are used to analyze the newly found indicator relationships and to
determine breakpoints of these relationships that indicate either an increase or de-
crease vulnerability to terrorism.
5.2 Classes
To conduct classification, the dependent data is divided into classes. The purpose
of this classification is to determine which countries are most vulnerable to terrorism
and which factors (at specific levels) these countries have in common. While it is true
that one terrorist attack can have severe consequences, one terrorist attack could
be labeled as a terrorist incident rather than a recurring problem. Therefore, the
cutoff will not be countries with no attacks and countries with one or more attacks.
Additionally, by not using one as the cutoff, this provides a buffer against common
complaints against the GTD such as data collection and a broad definition of terror-
ism. Classification trees require sufficient observations in both classes so that insight
can be provided for both sides of the tree. This is due to the nature of classification
trees and their dependence upon sample size. Table 13 depicts cumulative probability
of number of attacks.
70
Table 13. Distribution of Terrorist Attacks
The cutoff was set to four terrorist attacks. This means that countries with less
than four attacks in a year are in one class and those with four or more attacks are
in the other class. This allows the focus on terrorism to highlight the top 25% of
annual terrorist attacks. This classification looks at socio-economic indicators and
the breakpoints of those indicators which separate the top 25% of annual terrorist
attacks.
5.3 Classification Tree Description
Classification Trees analyze a relationship between variables. As opposed to re-
gression, classification trees analyze the independent variables in regards to a depen-
dent variable which split the data into classes. The independent variable that causes
the greatest split in the dependent data starts the tree. For instance, all or the vast
majority of countries with a population greater than some amount are more likely
to have a higher vulnerability to terrorism. Conversely, countries below the same
specified population are less vulnerable to terrorism. This divides the data into two
groups. Using the same procedure, these groups are further split using factors which
provide the best classification potential. This continues until a group can no longer
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be split or some other stopping criteria is met. At the end of each branch of the tree
is a number that represents the dominant class at the end of that branch. ANOVA
trees differ from classification trees in that instead of classes they divide the data into
larger and smaller values and report the average at the end of the tree. When using a
zero or one as the values of the dependent variable, an ANOVA tree returns the per-
centage of the group in class one. Therefore, in order to add transparency, ANOVA
results using the class dependent variable are added to the classification trees.
To interpret a classification tree, an individual, or in this case a country, assess
which side of the breakpoint they lie upon and follow that branch. Then they would
do the same at the next breakpoint until they reach the end of the tree. At the end
of the tree they should determine whether they were correctly classified, determine
their prediction for the upcoming year, or look at attributes of similar countries in
the other class depending upon their purposes for using the tree.
5.4 Models
Two different models are used to construct classification trees. The first tree is
constructed using all the variables from the full model of the exploratory analysis.
The second model only looks at the variables used in the reduced model without
outliers. The lags are left out of the classification since the goal of this research is
to find indicators which could be used to decrease terrorism vulnerability. Finding
the breakpoints in the lags does not provide useful insight as they are not directly
controllable. Additionally, while some models removed the countries of Nigeria and
Somalia from analysis, these countries remain in the analysis of classification trees.
Due to classification, the extent of terrorism in these countries no longer drives the
model, but are simply grouped in with the other country-year combinations with four
or more attacks. The class with less than four attacks is represented by a 0 and the
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class with four or more attacks is represented with a 1.
Full Model Classification.
Figure 6. Classification Tree for Full Model
The classification tree for the full model can be seen in Figure 6. Circles at the
end of the tree indicate the classification, either a 0 or 1, and the ANOVA results in
parentheses show the percentage of data points in the group of class 1, high vulnera-
bility. The first division in the tree comes from population with the breaking point at
approximately 32.2 million people. The greatest separation occurs where the country
population is greater than 32.2 million (right side of the tree).
Continuing on the right branch of the tree the next division is population density at
34 people per square kilometer. Based upon our sample, when a country’s population
is higher than 32.2 million and population density is less than 34 people per square
kilometer that country is likely to experience 4 or more terrorist attacks. If the
population density is greater than 34, the tree continues down to the fragmentation
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score. A fragmentation score at this point greater than 8.65 always resulted in four
or more attacks in our example, where as less than that score resulted in analyzing
education. The education cutoff is 5.529 where countries spending more than 5.529%
of GDP on education are more likely to have a terrorist problem. However, unlike
the previously discussed classifications, the ANOVA results show that this cutoff is
not definite and contains some misclassification.
If the country has less than 32.2 million people, then fragmentation is the next
indicator to monitor. A fragmentation score higher than 9.15 makes terrorism more
likely, but not definite. However, a fragmentation score lower than 5.65 means the
vulnerability of a terrorism problem is likely small. If the fragmentation score is
between these ranges than the percent of GDP spent on the military is the next
indicator to examine. A country spending less than 1.348% is less likely to have a
terrorist problem, while other countries need to examine annual oil production. If
oil production is greater than .0175, regardless of the unemployment level resulted in
low vulnerability. Misclassification was at 38% for unemployment exceeding 9.65%;
this means oil producing countries with higher unemployment are more vulnerable.
Countries with oil production lower than .0175, next need to address border secu-
rity. Countries with border security greater than 8, at this point in the tree, have
greater vulnerability. While countries with a border security less than 8 only had less
terrorism vulnerability.
Now that this tree has been constructed, it is important to analyze these findings
to determine intervention strategies. It is not surprising that population is the first
classifier, since it is the most robust indicator in terrorism research. However, popu-
lation size cannot be easily influenced. Other variables of note include fragmentation
and population density, but once again not much can be done to influence these in-
dicators. However, countries with less than 32.2 million people with fragmentation
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scores less than 9.15 have some options to reduce the chances of high vulnerability
to a terrorism threat. These options include spending less on the military, however,
this could be ill-advised. If a country is an oil producer, it should focus on having a
low unemployment rate. This makes sense since oil producing countries are likely to
have better finances and a large unemployed population within that country is likely
to be disgruntled and potentially look to terrorism for either political dissonance or
to receive some money. If the country does not produce much oil, it is wise for that
country to invest in border security, because this could potentially reduce terrorism.
It is interesting to note that many of the variables deemed unimportant in regres-
sion become classifiers in the classification tree. This does not attack the legitimacy of
either methodology, but means that variables for predicting the quantity of terrorist
attacks and the variables for splitting high and low numbers of attacks are different.
In order to assess how well classification works for the variables in model 3, another
classification tree is constructed.
Reduced Model Classification.
The classification tree for the reduced model can be seen in Figure 7. Consistent
with the full model, population is the first classifier with a breakpoint at 32.2 mil-
lion people. Those with populations greater 32.2 million then need to assess their
fragmentation score. 19 out of 20 countries with fragmentation scores higher than
8.05 have high vulnerability, while other countries must assess their level of foreign
intervention. All countries with foreign intervention scores greater than 8.55 at this
point have a terrorism problem, while other countries need to assess the urbanization
of their population. Those countries with an urban population greater than 62.48%,
are more likely to have a terrorist problem than those that do not.
Those countries with a population less than 32.2 million also need to assess their
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Figure 7. Classification Tree for Reduced Model
fragmentation score. Countries with a fragmentation score greater than 9.15 are
more likely to have a terrorist problem, while countries with a fragmentation score
less than 5.65 are considered to have low terrorism vulnerability. The countries who’s
fragmentation falls between these intervals need to evaluate their freedom of the press.
Countries with a low freedom of the press, less than 28.5, are more vulnerable, while
the other country outcomes are based upon their education spending. Countries
spending greater than 6.082% of their GDP on education are more likely to have a
terrorism problem than countries which spend less.
This model has many similarities to the other model, such as population and
fragmentation being very important to classifying. However, there are numerous dif-
ferences as well. The indicators of foreign intervention, urbanization, education, and
freedom of the press are now useful classifiers and much easier to influence than the
population and fragmentation in a country. Consequently, the governing body of the
country has more feasible options to mitigate their country is terrorism vulnerabil-
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ity. For instance, countries with large populations and low fragmentation scores can
decrease the terrorism threat by decreasing foreign intervention or at least the percep-
tion, decrease urbanization by encouraging suburban living, and decreasing spending
on education or decrease the connection between general education and changes to
culture and society which perpetrates a terrorist mindset. On the other hand, coun-
tries with populations less than 32.2 million and with fragmentation scores between
5.65 and 9.15 can increase the freedom of the press in their country and decreasing
spending on education or decrease the connection between general education and so-
cietal changes which harbor a terrorist mindset. Coupling these strategies with the
strategies from the other classification tree provides leaders with a better understand-
ing of terrorists and some potential ways to decrease the vulnerability to terrorism in
countries across Africa.
5.5 Conclusion
Now that numerous indicators have been quantitatively explored, greater insight
has been found into terrorism and the terrorist mindset. These indicators have been
explored and have confirmed already found relationships, determined new previously
unexplored relationships, and confirmed non-existent relationships. Furthermore,
these indicators have been further examined using classification and certain break-
points have been identified which can be used to determine the attributes of countries
with greater terrorism threats, defined as the countries with the upper quartile in an-
nual terrorist attacks. While population and fragmentation in a country are the main
indicators of a terrorism problem, other indicators that can be influenced or shaped
within the constraints of the government were also found to reduce the effects of ter-
rorism vulnerability. These variables include military expenditure, border security,
unemployment, freedom of the press, urbanization, education, and foreign interven-
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tion. Lastly, these breakpoints were analyzed to give recommendations to decision
makers and the governing bodies of each country.
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VI. Conclusion
6.1 Summary
Currently, the U.S. government lacks a thorough knowledge of terrorism and their
mindsets, which causes the U.S. to take a reactionary response to terrorism instead
of a preventative approach. This research provided an outline to test social science
perspectives on terrorism and gain greater strategic insights into terrorism in Africa.
These questions were answered in Chapters III, IV, & V, respectively. The first
question looked to statistically defend the qualitatively based findings of Carter. The
second question examined additional variables beyond these explained by Carter.
The third question involved assessing important variables using a classification tree
to determine the breakpoints of these indicators.
6.2 Key Findings
The answer to these research questions returned numerous results; the key results
are summarized below.
Confirmatory Analysis.
Of Carter’s five factors, four of them were found statistically significant. Poverty
was insignificant, a common finding among terrorism research. Of the four significant
variables, only economic vulnerability had a relationship with terrorism contrary to
Carter’s beliefs. Economic fragility seems to indicate less terrorist attacks, since
stable economies provide preferred targets for terrorism. The last three variables
were corruption, border security, and fragmentation. In terrorism research, this is the
first time that border security has been assessed and a proxy defining the relationship
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of greater border security is used. Results show a reduction in terrorist attacks where
border security is greater.
Additionally, fragmentation held the greatest significance in the model and was
the second most important variable in classification after population, a common and
well defined indicator of terrorism in the literature. Carter’s qualitative analysis did
not perform well after being quantitatively assessed, however, not all of her five factors
were significant and the blocked cross-validation results produced a RMSE greater
than 50. Clearly, Carter’s five factors were not all related to terrorism and they
are not adequate by themselves to closely predict the number of terrorist attacks.
Consequently, an exploratory analysis of additional indicators garnered insight about
terrorism and helped to construct a potential preventative strategy.
Exploratory Analysis.
In the exploratory analysis, 17 potential indicators of terrorism, including the
four significant factors from Carter’s research were included. While some expected
relationships were robustly significant, such as population and fragmentation, other
unexpected relationships were robustly significant, such as education spending and
gender equality. Additionally, gender equality had the largest effect on terrorism,
behind the one year lag. The inclusion of these additional variables eventually led
to a model with a RMSE of approximately 25, reducing the confirmatory analysis
results by half.
Classification Analysis.
In order to further explore these variable relationships, the same variables were
used for classification purposes. A classification tree was used to determine the break-
points of these variables in order to determine the characteristics of countries with
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Table 14. Top Indicators Across All Analyses
and without a terrorism problem. It is important to note that a terrorism problem is
defined as having four or more attacks in a year. Two trees were constructed using
either 15 of the potential indicators, lag terms were excluded, or the 8 indicators that
were determined important. Both of these trees showed the importance of population
of and fragmentation in a country to the number of terrorist attacks. Although these
indicators are not easily changed, other indicators were also found to be significant
that can be altered much easier. This could lead to anti-terrorism strategies specific
to a country at certain population and fragmentation levels.
Overall.
Table 14 provides a summary of the analyses outcomes for all three approaches.
An “X” in the column represents either significance in the best model or presence(as
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in the classification trees). Border Security and Fragmentation are the most robust
indicators since they are important in all three analyses. Population, Unemployment,
Education Expenditure, Freedom of the Press, Foreign Intervention, and the One
Year Lag are also considered robust indicators, since they were deemed important in
every model they were analyzed.
6.3 Contributions
This research contains numerous implications and contributions to the academic
field of terrorism research as well as a practical approach to the governments con-
fronting terrorism that were not found in the extensive literature review conducted
for this research.
Academic Contributions.
This research is scoped to focus on recent terrorism threats in a specific region. It
is the first time where Africa has been exclusively examined with regards to terrorism.
While other researchers have used indicator variables to represent Africa, exclusively
examining Africa provides a clarity for how the specific variables operate for this
continent. Additionally, many researchers use as much data as possible going back
to the late 60’s. However, due to the changing nature of terrorism, this is the first
research to capture modern terrorism by examining the terrorism from the years 2007
to 2013.
The next academic contributions come from the confirmatory analysis. This is
the first time that a qualitative article has been examined and analyzed to provide
quantitative support. Conducting this type of exploratory analysis, provides support
or helps to counter perceived observational findings or initial beliefs about terrorism.
Second, many of the variables were seldom examined. Specific proxies for qualitative
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concepts are identified and investigated. Poverty and economic fragility specifically
incorporated new proxies, with less literature findings. Additionally, border security
remained a qualitative before. Now this research confirms the belief that greater bor-
der security reduces terrorism, quantitatively. This shows the importance of bridging
inter-discipline gaps among qualitative and quantitative research.
The rest of the academic contributions come from the exploratory analysis. As
mentioned before, this research is a new attempt to exclusively analyze Africa in
regards to terrorist attacks. Consequently, investigating variables which hold unique
meaning for Africa. Oil production is one variable that has rarely been analyzed
before and was found to have no statistically significant effect on the number of
terrorist attacks in Africa. Additionally, robustly significant relationships were found
for population, education spending, gender equality, and fragmentation. While it
is very common to build a model to examine relationships in the literature, it is
rare to test the predictive capabilities of the model. Next, the variables from the
exploratory analysis were used to construct classification trees to further analyze the
relationships and develop potential courses of action. This type of analysis is rarely
done in terrorism research.
Practical Contributions.
Whenever conducting research it is important to consider who should care about
this research and who would use this model. Clearly, African countries have a par-
ticular interest in the predictive model, as well as the classification trees, to reduce
vulnerability to terrorism. Other countries, as well as international organizations
who wish to reduce Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism would also be interested in
this research. In Africa, the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, similar
counter terrorism groups, and the African governments’ specific counter terrorism or
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counter intelligence organizations could use this model to shape strategic decisions.
Various U.S. organizations would have an interest in using this research including,
AFRICOM and DHS. Lastly, other countries and international organizations with
specific counter-terrorism components would find this research useful for considering
future DIME operations.
This research also has numerous practical applications, especially for countries
confronting terrorism. First, finding the statistically significant relationship between
increasing border security and decreasing terrorism can be vital to anti-terrorism
campaigns. While this finding may not at first seem impressive, it is important to
note that no current strategy to reduce terrorism has been quantitatively supported
[10]. Therefore, decision makers could look into spending money on border security
across Africa which shows promise to reduce terrorism vulnerability; this translates
to mitigating the terrorism threat and improving security stability across the region.
The other large practical application of this research are the potential strategies to
reduce terrorism for countries with specific population sizes and fragmentation scores.
Strategic resources put toward the right terrorism indicators provide a potential av-
enue to reduce the terrorism threat.
6.4 Future Research
While much research has been conducted to find the relationships indicative of
terrorism, this task will never be completed. Additionally, few researchers have further
explored these potential relationship and generated strategies to prevent terrorism.
This leaves many areas for additional research, as well as adaptations to research.
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Research Adaptations.
First, some changes could be made to the scope of the problem. For this research,
it was decided to analyze Africa. Smaller or larger regions of the world could be
analyzed. It may be interesting to see the effects of sub-Saharan Africa or parts
of Africa that may have been colonized by a specific world power. In the opposite
direction, it would be interesting to examine the same features including the Middle
East or even on a global scale. This research has shown Africa specific relationships,
such as border security, or lack of relationship, such as oil production. It would be
interesting to test these relationships at the global level to see if they are valid only
for Africa or descriptive of terrorism in general.
Another aspect of the scope that could be altered is the analysis time frame. Due
to the establishment of AFRICOM and the Iraq troop surge, it was determined to
start the analysis in the year 2007, however, claims could be made to analyze over
other time periods. Once again, it would be interesting to take these results and see
if they are applicable to other time frames. This would should how robust the results
are and if our findings are applicable to pre-modern terrorism as well as modern
terrorism.
Another important part of this research that could be adapted is variable selection.
It would be interesting to analyze the results of the analysis, especially the exploratory
analysis if different variables are selected. For instance, it was hoped that variables
related to religion would be collected and analyzed, such as percent of the population
that is Christian and the percent of the population that is Muslim. However, this
data could not be collected with the same integrity as the other data used.
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Additional Research.
Aside from potential adaptations, this research has set the foundation for future
research to be conducted. First, further validation of the model should be competed
with data that the GTD releases in 2015 and subsequent years. This could remedy
problems with large miss predictions in 2013. Additionally, throughout the research,
a shortage of data was a sizable concern. Having additional years provides more data
for modern terrorism, which can be used to create an expanded model or to simply
improve the current model.
The changes in 2013 indicate greater than expected increases. The models in this
research, especially chapter III and IV, assume stationarity. This should be relaxed
and methods developed or investigated to handle non-stationary time series data.
While not apparent in the 2013 data, a spatial component could be necessary to
explain the sharp growth of terrorism in the year 2013 if this trend continues to 2014.
Further improvements to the model could be pre-processing the data with a Prin-
cipal Component Analysis (PCA). This could paint even more detail into how the
independent data is interrelated and how those relationships affect terrorism. Addi-
tionally, discriminant analysis or neural networks could be used to classify aside from
the classification tree in order to determine the important factors for classification by
the size of affect as well as conducting a dimensionality assessment.
Additional research could be conducted to focus upon the practical application
of this research. For instance, numerous strategies to potentially reduce terrorism
vulnerability were highlighted. This strategy identifies which variables and their lev-
els are indicators of terrorism. They do not describe specific strategies or actions
required to help shape the environment. For instance, if a country needs to reduce
unemployment, it could look at spending more on border security, which would pro-
vide additional jobs and further protect the borders. A greater understanding of the
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indicators will aid strategic decision making and resource allocation. Furthermore,
these specific strategies should be examined or potentially simulated to determine
their effects. For instance, it seems that promoting border security prevents terror-
ists from crossing the border and committing attacks, but does increased security
stop the attack or just relegate it to the country of origin? This and similar ques-
tions should be answered before implementation. Once these questions are answered
a risk analysis should be conducted upon these strategies to determine the worst
case, best case, and most likely outcomes of the strategy. This additional analysis
would bridge the gap between statistically validated suggestions and fully planned
and implementable strategies.
6.5 Way Ahead
Since the late 90’s, terrorism has been growing in both the quantity of terrorist
attacks and the lethality of those attacks [3]. Various governments have witnessed
this growing problem and responded with various counter-measures. With incidents in
Africa at all time highs in 2013, these measures are proving inadequate. Identifying
underlying patterns or indicators of terrorism provides an opportunity to change
strategies and decisions to prevent greater escalation in the upcoming years. After
years of conflict and military operations aimed at mitigating terrorism, we must look
for ways to foster diplomatic relations and leverage other resources to reduce the
vulnerability to terrorism across Africa and the World.
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